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T H E S I S

LIABILITY OF FELLOW SERVANTS

IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT

FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY THEM TO EFACH OTHER.

by

John Kern

Patterson, Jr.

Cornell University

1895

LIABILITY OF FELLOW SERVANTS IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT
FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY rIIIEM TO EACH OTHER.

Wile actions brought against employers by their servants
and by third persons are very common at the present day, Yet
those actions in which one'se*rvant sues his co-servant under
the same master, to recover for injuries caused by the other
to him are uncommon, and seldom appear in the reports.

This

is probably due to the facts that the servant or employee is
not, in general, as responsible a person in a financial way,
as the employee or m.aster is.

Such an action as this is us-

ually brought only when the action against the common employer
has failed, by reason of a failure to prove that the amster
'etas not

guilty of negligence,

or for some reason could

not

be held.
But

;hatever may be the reason for thi infrequency of ac-

tions by one servant against his fellow servant, it is nevertheless true that an action does lie in some cases.

It is a

well settled principle of law that every person is liable for
his ovn crimes and positive wrongs done to every other person.
A servant is under no less a duty to others to abstain from
committing crimes and positive wrongs,

merely because he is a

such
He cannot shield himself from liability in

servant.

cases by showing that he acted under

orders from his employer.
But every one

to do a wrong.

No p2rsen can authorize another

or employee, is re,wlhether he be master or servant, employer
of bisneglisponsible to others who are injured.by reason
in his indiPence in fulfilling obligations resting upon him
vidual, character.

These are the obligati-ns which the law

imposes upon all pe'sons, independent of contract.

No man in-

creases or diminishes his obligations to strangers by
an a-ent or servant; but

if, in the course of his agency, he

comes into contact with the person or property
he

liable for ang injury he may do

is

in

gence

the performance

cormion with all
It

becoming

of duties

of a stranger,
by his negli-

to either,

imposed by law upon him,

in

other mei .

has be-n held in

some cases that 2n action could not

maintained by one servant against another in the sL-me employment, for injuries caused by the other, merely for the reason
that

they were

not be

the case

fellow servants.
is

That,

on reason,

evident from a consideration

tions of master and servant.

such should

of the rela-

In such a case, a servant would

have no recovery against any one unless he could prove that
his mster was himself negligent, no matter how careles

his

?

fellow se-vant

inih

1

be.

-ish

In one ol 1he e,l'

that of Southeote v. Stanley, 1 11. & 1-.

cases,

247, decided in the

soid to
Court of Exchequ'r in 1856, Chief Justice Pollock is
have uttered this dictum:"Neither can one servant
action ar'ainst another for negligence while
cormon employment".
port of the same

nmintain an

engaged in theirc

But this was mere dictum and another re-

case does not containit.

decided otherwise in later English cases.

It hs since been
In Albro v. Jaquith

4 Gr"y, (Mass) page 101, which was an action of tort, brought
a, ainst the superintendent of a cotton and woolen raill in VWes
Springfield, to recover damages for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff,

while in

the employment

of the company, from the

escape of gas, occasioned by the negligence, carelessness and
unskillfulness of the defendant

in the management of the appa-

ratus and fixtures used in the mill for the purpose of generating etc. inflamable gas for the lighting of the mill, Merrick
J., said,- "Many of the considerations of justice and policy,
which led to the adoption of -he general rule, now perfectly
well established,

that a part.

who employs several persons in

the conduct of some conmon enterprise or undertaking, is not
responsible to any one of them for the injurious consequences

of the mere negligence or carelessness of the others in the
perforrance of their respective duties, have an equal signif-

icancy and force when applied to actions brought for like

the former case,

the latter,

In

cause by one servant against another.

as in

re presumed to understond knd appreci-

they

ate the ordinary risk and peril incident

to the service in

which they ar e employed, and to pr-edicate the compensation
some weasure,

upon the extent of the

they are to receive,

in

hazard they assun .

The knowledge that no legal redress is

forded

-4

for damages occasioned by the inattention or unfaith-

fulness of other laborers engaged

in the same common work,

will naturally induce such one to be not only a strict observer of the conduct of others,

but to be more prudent and care-

ful himself, and thus by increased vigilance to p.romote the
,,elfare ard safety of all".
102,

In Osborn v. Morgan, 130 Mass.

which was an action for damages brought by one servant a-

gainst his fellows servant, Judge Gray, commenting on the case
of Albro v. Jaquith, supra, says, "Upon consideration, we are
all

of the opinion that that judgement

mpported by no sat-

is

isfactory reasons and must be over-ruled."
he says:"Even the master 's not
servants for his own negligence;
tract with, ari

And at page 105,

exempt fromliability to his
and the servants make no con-

receive no compensation from each other.

may vell be doubted whether a knowledge,

It

on the part of the

servants tht they were in no event to be responsible

Griffiths v.

prudent himself."

58 Ind.

Harbou,

to the same effect.
it

seems to

dima-

would bend to make each more careful and

ges to cne another,

Hinds v.

in

321,

Wolfrain,

-nnimerous

22 Minn.

185 :nd

other authoritios ae

Both on rc-ason and authority,

be well settled at the present

therefore,

day that the fact

that they are fello-a servants will not be an obstacle in
wiav, of a

the

recovery.

The authorities being unanimous at the present

day in

holding that the f-ct that the parties are fellow servants,
does not inferfere with the right of action,

let us see in

what cases one servant may recover against another,
servant,

for injuries caused by the latter.

a fellow-

We have already

seen that a recovery may be had by one servant against another
for his crimes

and positive wromgs.

liable to each other negligence,
ance,

But

re fellow servants

or only for their misfeas-

as distingulihed from their nonfeasance?

isthe doing what a person rnay lawfully do,
ner.

Nonfeasance

don's duty to do.

is

in

Misfeasance
an improp.Sr man-

the not doing of that which it

is

a per-

By the weight of authority in most of the

states a distinction ismade between misfeasance and nonfeasance,

the servant being held answerable

for theformer but not

for the latter.
least.

Such a distinction seems unjust, at the

The idea that a servant

in charge of a piece of work

is to be hsld civilly liable, wh re he i.:kes an honest attempt to perform his duty, but through an unintentional blunder, does the work allotted to him in what is callod a careless and negligent manner ; while another servant engaged in
the saye

line of wQrk ana under the same obligation,

who posi-

tively andintentionally fails or refuses to pe'form his work
in any part is to be excused from all liability to one
by or through his non performancet aeems unjust indeed.

injured
Grif-

fiths v. Wolfrain, 22 Minn. 185, was an action brought by a
plaintiff
negligence

to recover for injuries received by him through the
of the defendants,

constructing an arch.

fellow servants with him,

in

No distinction was made in this case

between misfeasance and non feasance, although it was clearly
a case of misfeasance, or the improper doing of what a
might lawfully do.

Giltian, C. J.,

person

at page 187, says, "Who-

ever was guilty of the negligence if there was any, is liable
to the plaintiff, unless there was contributory negligence on
his part, for any injury which he sustained by reason of it.
This liability does not rest upon any liability imposed by
privity of contract,

for in such cases there may not be,

and

frequently is

not,

any such privity.

But the duty of each to

do the work with proper care grew out of the relation which
existed between them as persons

engaged in the same work,

in

which the negligent or unskillful performance of his ra rt by
one may cause danger to the others,

in which each must depend

for his safety upon the good faith,

skill

an.] prudence of each

of the others in doing his prt of the wiork,
of each to t];eiothers

engaged in'the work,

then it

to exercise

care and skill ordinarily employed by prtdent men in
circumstances."

Blinds v.

Harbou,

is

58 Ind. 121,

the duiT
the

similar

was an action

brought by Harbou, a carpenter in the employ of Studebaker
Brothers Manufacturing Company against the defendant Hines and
the company.

It appeared that the plaintiff was at work as a

earpenter on the second story of the building near the wall
which fell,

and that he knew nothing of the character of the

excavation going on at the foot of !.he wall; which excavating
was so negligently done at the direction of the defendant,
Hines,

tha-

case also,

the wall fell

ardinjured

the plaintiff.

In this

no distinction was inde between misfeasance and

nonfeasance, the court saying at page 126, "The point is made
that

this action will not lie;

that a setvant

isnot liable

for

injuries happening through the negligence to a fellow servant
in the employment
iness.

Albro v.

of the same mster in the same general busJaquith-;

rStanley.

Southcote v.

Elementary

writers doubt or deny the authority of these cases.
may well be that in

not clearly perceive how it

cormunity of employees of the same orployer,
eral undertaking,

We do

the little

uipon ti-B same gen

the ccnmon dutiesof man to man in

society

generally should cease to exist, and as a consequence, liability for breaches of them.
tained."

We Lhink the action may be main-

In this last case the court had before it the dis-

tinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, because it cited
the cases of Albro v.
though it
lie

Jaquith and

outhcote v.

did not follow them, but held that

St3nley,

al-

an action would

for negligence generally.
In New York there is a well settled distinction between

misfeasance and nonfeasance.
which the question,

586.

In

case in this

as to the liability

to another for injuries,
Hun,

The first

that case it

of one fellow servantt

came up, was in Fort v.
W al'predt

state in

Whipple,

11

that one Shipman con-

tracted to build a bridge and employed the defendant,

a skill-

ful builder, and gave him the sole managemen

and contrel of

the work and of the manner of carrying it

all

on,

the other

employees

being in all respects subject to his orders.

Undrr

defendant 's direct ion and supervision o scaffold was erected,
secured by stay laths, upr
ials were placed.

which laborers viorked and anter-

Some of these laths wcra remved by the di-

rection of the defend:11nt,

the plaintiff aiding in so doing.

Subsequently the scaffold fell and the plaintiff was injured
thereby.

The court, by E'ockes, J., after holding that 'he de-

fendant was an alter ego of 1he principal and that therefore
there was no insuperable difficulty in lw growinm, out of the
relation of the parties to each other as coemployoes, said,
"WIe are not now called upon to decide the question whether an
action may or may not be maintianed forne.-ligence by one employee a)3ainst another where both :.,re engaged in the same service under a con-on employer, in a case where the latter woula
not be lable.

Of course an action would lie in such a cse

for a direct injury as a trespass', butperhaps there might be a
question whether an action would lie in such a case for a mere
nonfeasance or neglect of duty."

Jurray v. Usher, 117 1'.

Y.

542, was an action brought by plaintiff to recover damages for
alleged negligence causing the death of Blanchard, plaintiff's
intestate, who was r.eemployed by the defendants 1urray and Usher as a day laborer in their saw mill.

While so employed a

platform on which he was fell, and he received inji-wies causing his death.

Lewis and the plaintiff's intestate wete co-

servants of tho owners of the mill,
al charge and superintendence
vision of the owners,
tine to time.

the former having

of the business

gener-

under the super-

who themselves gave directions from tim

They instructed Lewis to look after the neces-

sary repairs and the evidence justified t1e inference that,
respect to the platform,

he oimmitted to perform his duty.

in
An-

drews , J., said, "The general rule of respondeat superior
charges t1e nster with liability for the servant's negligence
in the master's business causing injury to third persons. They
may in general treat the actsof the servant as the acts of the
master.

But the aent or servnnt ishimself liable as well as

the master where the act producing the injury, although committed in the master's business, is a direct trespass by the
servant upon the person or property of another, or where he i4
rects the tortious act.

In such cases the fact that he is act

ing for another does not shield him from responsibility.
distinction is between misfeasance and nonfeasance.

The

For the

former the servant is, in general, liable; for the latter not.
The servant, as between himself and his master, is bound to
serva him with fidelity

and to perform the duties committed to

him.

An omission to perform them may subject third persons

to harm and

he master to damages.

co4i

Eut the breach of the

tract of service is a matter between the master and servant alone, and the nonfeasance of the servant causing injury is
not, in 7eneral at least, a ground for a civil action against
the servant in their favor."

The Llurray case was followed in

a late case in the Supreme Court of i:Tew York, lurns v. Pethcal
27 1,*.
Y. Supp. 503, in which Liartin, J., delivering the opinion says:- "The question is presented whwther this action
could be maintained by the plaintiff to recover for the death
of her intestate against

the defendant who was a coemployee.

'T7his question was raised by the defendant's motion for a nonsuit, made at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, and renewed after all the evidence in the case had been received.
One of the grounds of the motion was thatthere was no such relation existing between two coamployeee as authorized one to
bring an action against another on the ground of negligence.
The English authorities upon the question of the liability of
a serv:ant or agent to a third per-son for on act

or omission

performed or omitted by him while engaged in the business of
the i-imster, are to the effect that

the servant is liable

for

misfeasance, though the act be in obedience to the master's
order,

but not for mere nonfeasance or omission of duty to

persons,

third

persons

to third

for the master's neglect.

We think it

prev-ils

generally

be safely said thal
and other

this

of some judges
is

liable

the English rule

and text

writers

effect

to the

with his master.

in

that a servant

injured by his negligence,

persons

to third

may

the broad declarations

notwithstanding

states,

alone or jointly

:.nswerable

who Alone is

only to the master,

but

either

with the au-

The conflict

It

than real.

thorities upon the question is more apparent

has arisen from a failure to observe clearly the distinction
between misfoasance and nonfeasance, and

from an omission to

point out the fact that, while a servant is liable in the one
case,

he isnot

in

the

Disregarding this

other.

generl

stated in

some judges and authors have

distinction,
terms,

that a

servant is liable for his own negligence to a person injured
thereby.
feasance

is

doing of an

the improper

lawfully do.

If

the duty omitted b-1

ter,

only of a

and the a'aster

upon him in

alone

the agent

liable;

his individual char-,cter,
0

while

'o.

if

and was

or ser,

enmployment,

duty he owes his principal
is

to

which a person

t

vant devolved upon him purely from his agency or
his ommission is

Non-

inaccurate and misleading.

the onission of an act which a person ought

Misfeasance is
might

is

Such a statement

or mas-

the duty rested
one that

the l:w

imposed upon him independent of his agency or employment, then
That such is the doctrine in this state, anI

he is liable.

that when applied to the case before us, it requires us to
hold that this action cannot be maintained, is rendered quite
an examination of the case of MIurray

rpanifest, we think, by

Other cases in support of this distinction

v. Usher, supra".

are Fetters v. Swan, 62 Iliss. 415; Delaney v. Rochereau, 34
La. Ann. 1123; Reid v. Hub9r49 Ga. 207; Labadie v Hawley, 61
Tex. 177; Osborne v. Mlorgan, 13 :ass. 102; Albro v. Jaquith,
4 Gray (Mass.) 101.

We have seen that by the weight of authority a servant
is answerable civilly for misfeasance as distinguished from
nonfeasance,

rather than for his negligence generally.

For

his negligence not consisting of misfeasance, he is responsible only to his master.

But how are we to distinguish be-

tween misfeasance and nonfeasance?
tion to a given case?
6f application.

How to apply the distinc-

Mt must necessarily be very difficult

Judge Story says, in section 309 of his work

on agency, "The distinction thus propounded, between misfeasance and nonfeasance,- between acts of direct, positive

wrong

and mere neglects by agents, as to their personal liability

therefor, iray seem nice and artificial and partakes perhaps,
not a little of the aubtility and over refinement of the old
doctrines of the coinon law.

Tt seems, however, to be founded

upon this ground, that no authority from a superior c-n furnish to any party

11just defence for

his own positive torts

and trespasses; for no man can authorize another to do a positive wrong.

But in respect

to nonfeasance or nero neglects

in the performance of duty, the responsibility therefor must a
rise from some express or inplied obligation between particular parties standing in priority of law and contract with each
otber, aid no

man isbound to answer for any such violation

of duty or obligation, except to those

*to whom he has become

directly bound or answerable for his conduct.

Whether the

distinction be satisfactory or not, it is well established,

4

though some niceties and difficulties occasionally occur in
its practical application to firticular cases".

Let us see

how the cases apply the distinction.
Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray (Mass.) 309, was an action
brought by plaintiff to recover damages from the defendant for
causing water to over-flow from a sink in a seccnd Story of a
building to the first floor, thus danagini
ing to the plaintiff.

some goods belong-

It appeared that the board of water

commissioners

had caused the water to be shut off from the

premises for non-payment of the
fendant,

water rates,

who was the agent of his wife,

being informed that one

the de-

who o-ned the premises

of the tenants wanted the water,
paid the water rates,

to the wster comissioner,
the water to be let on,

and that

went

ari directed

which was dane; and the faucet in

an

upppr room was left open so th.t the wviter, after filling
the
sink,overflowed and soaked through the floor into the plaintiff's

shop and damaged his property.

the orinion said,

Eletcalf,

J., delivering

"The defendant's omission to examine the

state of the pipes in

the house before

turned on, was a nonfeasance.

causing the water to be

But if he had not caused the

water to be let on, that nonfeasance would not htve injured
the plaintiff.

If he had examined the pipes and left

a proper condition,

and then

them in

caused the letl ing on of the wa-

ter, there would have beea neither nonfeasance nor rnisfeasance.

As the facts are the nonfeasance caused the act done

to be a misfeasance.

But from which did the plaintiff suffer?

Clearly from the act done,
reason of its
Wright,

being preceded by a nonfeasance."

3 Allen (Mass.)

damges for

which was no less a misfeasance, by

167,

injuries to the

Howell v.

was an action of tort to recover
plainififf

sustained by falling

into the Ch:,rles River

in the night time, at

of' the

the draw

Warren Dridge, through the negligence of the defendant who was
the

tender of the draw-bridge, in not Thutting the gates and

hanging out lanterns while opening

the draw.

Dewey, J.,

these circtunstances, t

delivered the opinion, said,"Under

who
per-

sonal liability attached to him for an injury to a third person, caused by his improper discharge of his duties.
was not a mere naked act

of nonfeasance.

draw was the c-use of the injury.
defendatit.
the draw,
That

I.

is

true that

it

The opening of' the

That act was done by the

was lawful and prorer

but stich opening was to be done

required due regard and caution for

ellers

passing the

bridge,

guards

for their protection.

His act

in

to

open

a prer manner.

the safety of trav-

anI the use of reasonable

safe-

The defendant, by omitting to

discharge his duty in this respect, may be held responsible
for an injury occasioned thereby."
Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray (Mass.) 99, was an action of
tort

brought against the

superintendent

of a cotton and woolen

mill at West Springfield to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff,
pany,

while

from the escape of gas,

in

the employrent of the com-

occasioned by the carelessness

negligence and unskillfulness of the defendant in the manage-

ment of the apparatus and fixtures used in the mill for the
purpose of generating, containing, conducting etc., inflammab&e gas for the lighting of the mill.

L1errick, J., said, "ITo

misfeasance of

positive act of wrong i.; chsrged or imputed to

the defendant.

The wiole gvound of :oniplaint against him is b

that, having the care and superintendence of the fixtures for
the purpose of generating gas etc., he was negligent, careless
and unskillful in the management of them.

His obligation to

be faithful and diligent in this particular resulted either
from an express con ract with with his principal or is to be
implied from the nature and character of the service in which
he was engaged.

I'nd because thi's is

the sole origin and foun-

dation of his duty, he is responsible only to the pwty to
whom it is due for the injurious consequences of neglecting it
She therefore c.n have no legal right to conplain of his carelessness or unfaithfulness; for he he had mde himself by no
act or contract, accountable to her."
ed

This case was comment-

on by the highest court of M assachusetts in the case of

Osborne v. Morgan, 130 1'.ass.
ruled.

102, and was declared to be over-

In this latter case it appeared that whdle the plain-

tiff was at work as a carpenter in the establishment of a manufacturing corporation, putting up by direction of the corpo-

tation certain partitions in

a room in which the corporation

was conducting the business of making wire, the defendants,
one the superintendent and the others agents and servants of
the corporation,

being employed in

that business, negligently
the

and without regard to the safety of persons rightfully in
room,

placed a tackle block and chains upon an iron rail

pended from the ceiling of the room,
main there in such

sus-

and suffered them to re-

a manner, and so unprotected from felling,

that by reason ther6eof they fell upon and injured the plaintiff.

Judge Gray said: "But, upon consideration, we are all

of the opinion that that judgment (Albro v. Jaquith, supra)
issupported by no satisfactory reasons and must be overruled.
The principal reason assigned was, that no misfeasance

or pos-

itive act of wrong was charged, and that for nonfeasance,
which was merely negligence in the performance

of a duty aris-

ing from some express or implied contract with his principal
or employer, an agent or servant was responsible to him only,
and not to any thrd person.
that an agent

It is often said in the books

is responsible to third persons for misfeasance

only and not for nonfeasance.

And it is doubtless true that

if an agent never does anything towards carrying out his contract with his principal, but wholly omits and neglects to do

so,

*he only one who can maintain any

the principal is

But if

against him for nonfeasance.

the agent

once undertakes

and enters upon :he execution of a particular work,
and

duty to use partic!?lar
executing it,

- asonable care in

9ction

it

is

his

the manner of

so :s not to cause any injury to third persas
natural consequences

which may be the

of his acts,

and he

cannot by abandoning its execution midway, and leaving 'hings
in a dangerous condition, exempt himself from liability to any
person who suffers

injury by reason of hi; having so left them
This is

without prpper safeguards.
nothing; but it

is

not nonfeasance

misfeasance or doing improperly.

genceo and unskillfuleess
by reason of which it

in

the management

escapes

or doing
Negli-

of inflammable gas

and causes injury,

can no more

be considered as mere nonfeasance within the meaning of the
rule relied on than negligence
Bell v. Josselyn, etc. supra,.

in

the control of water as in
In the case at bar the negli-

gent hangirkg and keepirg by the defendants of the block and
chains,

in

such a place and manner as to be in

ing upon persons underneath, was a misfeasance
dealing with instruments

in

the defendants'

danger of fallor improper

actual use or con-

trol."
In

all

four of these cases

last cited there was

a direct

act,

being connected with a

came a misfeasance by reason of its
in

nonfeasance

such a

be-

of itself,

which though perfectly lawful and proper

They were all

injury.

way as to cause

but in

cases of doing that which a person might lawfully do,
Those

an improl;er m'vnner.
tion

and the rule

of,

a;

cases were all within the

vase where the only act dor
work.

ticular
and

It

generally

us take the

Rut let

to misfeasance.

de fini-

consisted in undertaking a par-

may be perfectly lawful and lroper to do so,

is,

not become a misfeasance

but may it

by rea-

son of being joined or connected with a nonfeasance by the
just

same prson,
lis

v.

as any other

76 ,\Iich. 237,

iLlciaughton,

against

brought by the plaintiff

sidewalk to remain torn up.
was the agent
builAing

in

act may be.

ruts.

street

to the

ion,"The

for

against

fell

injured.

negligence

the

vs injured.
the
to

The wagons,

lot.

The plaintiff

time and was

the defendant

orders

charged in

erection of a
A portion of

of the defendant,

permit teams to go in
in

passing through,

into one of these ruts
Morse J.,

allowing a

appeared that the defendant

It

while the building was going on,
the

for damages

of which plaintiff

the sidewalk was removed,

El-

was an action

of his wife and superintended

fromt

think so.

I

said in

in

from

made

the night

delivering the opin-

the declaration was not alone

the tearing up or removal of the walk,

a dangerotus condition from April un-

to remain torn up and in

the time of the injury.

til

Every day it

was so permitted to

when the defendant had the entire control of it,

remain,

a misfeasance.

It

was his duty, knowing that the walk was re-

put down again and male reasonably safe for

to hav it

Chief Justice Gray,

travel.

102,

130 Mass.

is

'It

says,

in Osborn v.

Morgan (cited supra)

often said in

the books that an a-

only,

and not for nonfeas-

gent

is responsible for misfeasance

ance

-

-

-

But,

and

was a wrong and

the authority without question to repiaae it,

:.oved,

allowing it

but also in

if

the agent once actually undertakes

ters upon the execttion of a particular work,
to use reasonable

care in

it

is

the marner of executing it,

and en-

his duty 0
so as n

not to cause any injury to third pers ns which may be the natural consequences
its

of his acts; and he cannot,

by abandoning

and leaving things in a dangerous condi-

execution midway,

tion, exempt himself from liability to any person who suffers
injury by reason of his having so left
9afeguards.
is

This

is

them without proper

not nonfeasance or doing nothing; but it

doing misfeasance,-

doing improperly'.

In

the case before

us the defendant had entered upon the work of erecting this
building

Irrespective of his relation to his principal

he was bound while doing the work to so use the premises, including this sidewalk,

as not to injure others.

Misfeasance

May involve to some extent the idea of not doing; as where an
agent,

while engaged

in the performance

does not do something which it

of his undertaking,

was his duty to do under the

circumstances; as for instance, when he does not exercise that
care which a due regard for the rights of others would require
This is not doing, but it is the not doing of that which is
not imposed upon the agent merely by his relation to his principal,

but of that which is

imposed upon him by law as a re-

sponsible individual in common with all
ciety.
in

other members of so-

It is the sane not doing which constitutes negligence

any relation,

and is actionable."

This case would seem to support the proposition that if
a servant once undertakes a particular work, he is liable for
a want of due care in executing it.

But of course, if he does

not begin the wsork, although he contracted to do so, he is not
liable.

A good case in support of this proposition is Osborn

v. Morgan,supra,.

However all of the courts do not seem to

sustain this Iroposition.

Iurray v. Usher,supra, is one, al-

though in that case it was not necessary to the decision.

In

that case the defendant was instructed to look after the re-

23.

pairs but

failed to

the decision,

do so, and although not

the court said it

necessary for

was a nonfeasance.

I think that the better doctrine is

otherwise,but

courts are not unanimous on this subject as yet.

the

t

